We study if CEOs and their backgrounds matter for the performance of stateowned enterprises (SOEs) exploiting the fact that these companies had different CEOs (with different backgrounds) in different moments in time. We construct a database of Brazilian SOEs between 1973 and 1993 and make three tests. First, we use variance decomposition to study CEO effects. Second, we look at how much of the variation in performance can be explained by CEOs who switch companies. Third, we test if CEO background and ability matter for performance. We find sizable effects of CEOs on performance, especially for military managers and those who attended top universities.
Introduction
A large literature looks at the average performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private companies and finds that the former underperform the latter in most cases (for a review see Bortolotti, Fantini, & Siniscalco, 2004; Bortolotti, 2004; Megginson, 2005; Megginson & Netter, 2001) . In general, the conclusion of this vast literature is that SOEs are relatively inefficient compared to private companies and, therefore, governments would be better of privatizing these firms (or most of them). 1 Yet, governments face complex political economy environments that complicate the process of privatization or prefer not to privatize certain firms for strategic (or ideological) reasons. Thus, most governments around the world operate a large number of SOEs (Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta & López-de-Silanes, 1999; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2012) . That is, most of the world's governments operate in what most academics and practitioners consider a second-best scenario. What can governments in this scenario do to improve efficiency in SOEs?
This paper deals with a source of variation in SOE performance that has rarely been studied. We look at the contribution of managers to SOE performance and study if there are traits of a CEO background that may be correlated with better financial results in these firms. In our view, looking at the sources of heterogeneity in SOE performance is important because there is large variation in the performance of these companies either within countries, within industries, and even within companies themselves over time. That is, for any given country or industry, there are SOEs that perform well (even compared to private companies) and some that have a hard time showing good financial performance in the medium and long term. Figure 1 shows the variation in performance of private and SOEs that were publicly traded in Brazil, Rusia, India, and China in 2007. It is clear that even if SOEs underperform private companies on average, there is significant variation in the performance of state-owned firms. Could the variation in 1 The exception to this finding tends to take place when SOEs operate in contested markets Bartel and Harrison (2005) or when the governance of these firms replicates private companies (e.g. Kole & Mulherin, 1997) . Also, Bogart and Chaudhary (2012) find evidence that railways switching from private to public in India between 1874 and 1912 had a reduction in operational expenses by cutting labor costs. performance of SOEs be attributed to the role of CEOs? Which CEO-specific traits, such as background or political activity, improve or undermine the performance of SOEs?
In this paper we seek to understand managerial factors that may explain performance differences across SOEs. Specifically, we explore variation in the performance of SOEs related to the fact that these companies had different CEOs in different moments in time (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003) . There is both a theoretical (e.g. Rotemberg & Saloner, 1993 , 2000 and empirical (e.g. Beatty & Zajac, 1987; Malmendier & Tate, 2009 ) literature looking at the importance of CEOs for private firms, but there is virtually no study of CEOs in SOEs. By studying both CEO effects and CEO characteristics that can possibly affect the performance of SOEs, we put managers at the center of the debate on SOE reform.
If managers matter for performance, then the debate of SOE reform should include a discussion of manager selection, as well as on the incentives and competitive pressures those managers face. Furthermore, if CEOs matter to explain performance, it would be important to explain what backgrounds lead to better outcomes. In many countries, the appointment of CEOs in SOEs is part of either political bargaining among parties in a ruling coalition or simply a product of patronage. That is, governments sometimes choose the CEOs of state-owned enterprises on a rational way, hoping to get the best person for the job according to ability and qualifications, but most of the times the selection process is part of political bargains, mostly disregarding technical qualifications or ability. For instance, in India, the president and de facto CEO of the companies controlled by the federal government is usually a minister, appointed according to the division of ministries within the ruling coalition. Yet in many of these countries, the CEOs of SOEs are cronies of the politicians in power, with no experience in the industry, and no technical or managerial background relevant for the firm. Only in a few countries, such as Singapore, do SOEs have CEOs appointed following clear meritocratic rules.
Rather than relying on databases of recent performance of SOEs in a country with heavy state presence to conduct our tests, we use data from SOEs in Brazil between 1973 and 1993 . We think building a study of the CEO contributions to SOE performance with recent data can be objectionable for two reasons. First, after the process of privatization around the world, very few industries in a given country ended up having more than one SOE. That is, in many countries there is no variation within industries because the SOEs that survived the privatization process ended up operating as monopolies.
Second, in order to study the variation in performance within SOEs, we would preferably want to find an environment in which there are several firms per industry and in which we could have a large panel data set that can allow us to study the variation in performance of SOEs over time (i.e., within companies). Since the performance of SOEs may be determined by many unobservables beyond controlling for observable firm characteristics, we would like to have a database that allow us to control for firm unobservables and study changes in performance over long periods of time.
There are few countries where all of those conditions can be met and where databases with reliable information can be created.
Brazil between 1973 and 1993, in fact, is a setting that offers an interesting laboratory to study the variation in performance of SOEs for at least three reasons. First, there were a large number of companies for which financial data was reported frequently by independent business magazines and a government comptroller office specialized on SOEs known as SEST. Thus, we were able to compile systematic financial and employment data for around 250 SOEs for twenty-one years . Second, during this period of time, there were many public firms operating within the same industry (See Table 1 for the number of SOEs operating in each industry). Third, we have significant variation in performance within industry and within firms over time. Our empirical analysis is divided into three parts. First, we study the contribution of CEOs to explain the performance of SOEs. There are a series of studies that look at the CEO effect on performance by decomposing the variance of a performance variable (such as return on assets) into different components. First, Lieberson and O'Connor (1972) decompose the variation in performance discounting the year, industry, and company effects and find that CEOs account for 14.5% of the total variance in profit margins, while the industry effect have the biggest impact on profitability, explaining 28.5% of the variance. Weiner (1978) and Weiner and Mahoney (1981) find that CEOs explain between 8.7% and 12.8% of the variance in profitability. (Thomas, 1988) finds that CEOs explain only 5.7% of the variation in profitability. Wasserman, Anand, and Nohria (2010) find that the CEO effects explain about 14% of Tobin's Q. There is no similar work for managers of SOEs, but (Salancik, 1977) look at whether mayors have an effect on changing budget allocations in their jurisdictions and find that they explain little of the overall variance in of the expenditure variables.
Using a simple variance decomposition approach by running OLS regressions and adding variables one at a time, we find relatively large CEO effects explaining the performance of state-owned firms and other variables such as leverage. There is one major problem, however, with using this regression technique to extract the effect of CEOs: company-specific shocks may be confused with CEO effects. This is because the CEO effect would be extracted by having dummy variables for the tenure of each CEO.
As a way to avoid such problems, in our second test of CEO effects, therefore, we follow the methodology of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) , who examine the effects of executives (i.e., CEOs and CFOs) who switched firms. They use dummy variables to track each of the executives who switched firms and then examine the size of the coefficient for those CEO dummies. In that way, the effect they pick up for each of these CEOs (and CFOs) is their average contribution to their firms, a more realistic measure of CEO effects. They find that the effect of those CEOs who switch companies explains 5% of the variation in performance (measured as EBITDA over assets, a proxy for return on assets).
We find more modest contributions of CEOs to company performance, measured as return on assets or return on equity and high contributions to productivity measures. For instance, we find that CEOs who switched companies explain about 2% of the variation in return on assets of the SOEs in our sample. Switching CEOs, however, explain between 10 and 18% of the variation in productivity (either labor productivity or total factor productivity). We think our results are comparatively smaller because we are measure the effects of CEOs of SOEs, who face more constraints and controls than their private counterparts. Yet, we think they have larger effects on productivity because part of the discretion these CEOs have is to hire (or not) people and that is why we think they have a larger influence on labor productivity.
Our third empirical test examines the effects of CEO backgrounds and ability on SOE performance. We do this by separating CEOs by training and ability using education data. We study the effect of having a technical education (e.g., an engineering major), a military background, and a political background (the CEO had a political post at some point in his career). Finally, in order to study if ability (intelligence) matters more than the type of training of the CEO, we separate CEOs who attended top universities in Brazil and study separately their effect.
The literature looking at the background of SOE managers usually concludes that CEOs and executives with technical backgrounds have better performance than other executives. For Weber (1968) "the decisive reason for the advance of the bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization" (p. 973). Amsden (1989) defends the idea that engineers and other technical employees recruited in the top ranks of local universities were fundamental for the development of large heavy industries in the Republic of Korea. Schneider (1991) , Martins (1974) and Escobar (1982) defended the thesis that the best performing companies in Brazil were ran by executives with technical backgrounds (mostly engineers). For instance, according to Escobar (1982) 
technical managers at Companhia
Vale do Rio Doce, the largest state-owned mining company in Brazil, "…do not view themselves as social workers," because "the engineer is assumed to choose strategies prompted by the same basic motivations as his colleague in private enterprise."(p. 107).
A second hypothesis is that military CEOs are different. Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2010) look at the effect of life experiences of CEOs on company financial policies in the United States and find that military managers with combat experience tend to take more risks and to choose higher leverage. Benmelech and Frydman (2010) 
study military
CEOs and find that they perform better during downturns than nonmilitary CEOs and tend to engage less in corporate fraud. In Brazil, military CEOs were also selected to take on important strategic projects, such as running the airplane company Embraer.
Thus, from the literature we would expect military CEOs to show better performance than other managers, including technical CEOs, even if they took on more risks (e.g., even if they chose higher leverage).
A third hypothesis is related to CEO ability, rather than the kind of training they have. That is, perhaps what matters is not whether managers are politicians or have a technical background, but whether they have superior competence. We use information on whether CEOs attended a top university in Brazil as a proxy for ability. 2 Federal universities were (and still are) the top universities in Brazil. There is no tuition at those public universities and admission is based on highly competitive exams that tend to help these schools to screen for some of the most intelligent students in the country.
Thus, attending a federal university in Brazil is a proxy for ability among managers who attended domestic universities, as opposed to military academies.
Our results using both OLS with random and fixed effects show that companies with CEOs with technical backgrounds (e.g. engineers) did not perform better than others, once we control for industry or company observables and unobservables (in the fixed-effects regression). This suggests that the CEO effect is not due to training per se, but rather due to intrinsic competence. Our variable measuring if the CEO attended a top university is consistently significant and implies that CEOs with high ability ran firms that had higher return on assets (2% higher than the average). Thus, our results refine previous arguments on the role of technical versus political CEOs; we find that ability is apparently more important than the fact that the CEO is a politician or a professional with technical expertise.
In contrast to our findings for non-military CEOs, background does matter for military managers. We find that military CEOs ran more profitable firms (in the random effects regressions) and that they tended to improve firm performance when they took over from a non-technical civilian manager (according to the fixed effects regressions).
Moreover, military CEOs with technical backgrounds consistently improved the performance of the companies they ran. In sum, our findings lead us to conclude that military CEOs are actually better at running state-owned firms than technical or civilian managers.
2 Few CEOs studied abroad and those who did usually also had a bachelor's degree from a Brazilian university. CEOs of state-owned enterprises who studied abroad did not attended top tier higher education institutions.
We divide the paper into four additional sections. The following section explains the history and landscape of SOEs in Brazil, with special attention to our period of analysis, . The third part of the paper explains the data that we have and the hypotheses we are testing. The fourth section presents our main findings. In the last section we present our conclusions.
State-Owned Enterprises in Brazil
We choose to study SOEs in Brazil between 1973 and 1993 for two reasons. First, that period is when state capitalism in Brazil was at its peak. The federal government alone owned over 120 companies, with another few hundred owned and controlled by state governments (See Figure 3 and Figure 4 ). Because initially the government did not control the focus of these state-owned firms, the largest firms ventured into a variety of industries and created large diversified conglomerates (Trebat, 1983) . As companies opened relatively independent subsidiaries in many industries, our database allows us to benefit from the variation in performance among SOEs within each industries. Thus, we can control for industry and for industry-time effects in our regression analysis, which is important when dealing with firms in which there were very different characteristics of the industry that changed over time, such as openness to trade or price controls.
Second, in the late 1970s is when the government began publishing financial data for SOEs in a systematic fashion. Using different libraries in Brazil, and business magazines, we have been able to collect financial information of close to 250 SOEs for 21 years as well as the names of 856 CEOs and biographical information of over 450 of them. Because our identification strategy looks at the change in CEOs and their effects on firm performance, leverage, and productivity over time, having a long panel of observations with significant variation within company over time is key.
Most of the methodologies we use in this paper come from studies of the performance of and CEO effects in private firms. Yet, we think it is ok to use them to study SOEs because in many ways they can be thought of as relatively autonomous firms, at least before 1983. In 1967, the military government of Brazil passed The Administrative Reform Law (Decree-Law 200, 1967) , which granted SOEs the same treatment as private companies. Rather than forcing firms to follow any specific development plan, this law made firms adjust themselves to successive governmental plans (Wahrlich, 1980) . Motta (1980) argues that in the case of "large firms, the ministry [in charge of regulating it]-the majority of times-does not have the power to name the president or directors," because the top executives of the firm were "politically more important than the minister himself" (p. 75).
According to Trebat (1983) , many SOEs were autonomous enough to run their companies almost as private firms. Some of the largest and more internationalized SOEs issued debt in foreign currency, opened subsidiaries in other countries and acquired and developed firms at home that sometimes competed with the firms of other SOEs. In 1979, the Brazilian government created the State-Owned Enterprises Supervisory Agency (known as SEST in Portuguese) and began to collect data on the companies in which the federal government had a significant share of equity.
The government, however, did not start exercising full control of SOEs until after 1983, when macroeconomic conditions forced it to control expenses with personnel, capital investments, and debt levels. Since 1979 the Brazilian government and its SOEs had been running into difficulties to refinance their debt as Paul Volcker, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in the United States, started to raise interest rates rapidly.
The interest rate hikes in the United States complicated the refinancing of lines of credit for both the government and SOEs. In 1982, the situation deteriorated for the managers of SOEs and for the Brazilian government when the government of Mexico suspended payments on its foreign debt, instigating fear among international banks, which ended up closing lines of credit for Brazil as well. This generated a balance of payments crisis that led the Brazilian government to seek help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Among the conditions to support the Brazilian government, and as a way to reduce the budget deficit of the government, the stabilization package of the IMF required that the government controlled both expenses and debt issues of SOEs, especially debt issues in foreign currency. Therefore, after 1983 the SOEs in our database were under tight scrutiny from SEST and from different ministries (Werneck, 1987) .
Moreover, after 1985 the government controlled some prices, salaries and hiring in stateowned companies and forced them to reduce payroll expenses nominally. 3 The financial crisis of the 1980s and the series of failed measures the government implemented to try to control expenditures also led to rampant inflation, which by the late 1980s reached hyperinflation levels (more than 50% inflation per month). With high levels of inflation, it is hard for companies to keep their financials corrected for inflation.
In Brazil, since 1976 the Brazilian government made it mandatory for companies to "adjust" the value of their fixed assets according to inflation using an official index that usually underestimated inflation. 4 Therefore, we transform all the figures to dollars by converting all the data that we have, which was in different Brazilian currencies, to Brazilian real, the currency the Brazilian government adopted in 1994 and which it pegged to the dollar at a 1-to-1 exchange rate (we converted the data first to reais and then deflated it using the so-called IGP-DI price deflator 5 ). Moreover, because of the operational difficulties CEOs faced in the 1980s, especially after 1985, with high inflation, price controls by industry, and obstacles to hire new employees, improving the financial performance of their firms was a daunting task. Return on assets of SOEs in the 1980s were usually negative and many of the firms in our sample operated with negative equity (i.e., they were technically bankrupt) until the government recapitalized them.
Finally, the period we study is also divided into two by the democratization of Brazil in 1985. In 1964 a military coup with strong support from industrialists overthrew the democratic regime and its left-wing president. Between 1964 and 1985 Brazil had five 3 For the difficulties SOEs faced after 1982 and for the changes in regulation see Werneck (1987); Trebat (1983) ; the reports of SEST; and Decree Number 92,005, November 28 th , 1985, which orders the reduction in payroll outlays by 10% between 1985 and 1986. CEOs and members of the board could lose their job if they did not meet such targets. Yet, it was rarely enforced. 4 Companies had to revalue their fixed assets using an official inflation index, the amounts that those adjustments represented had to also be increased to the value of shareholder's capital. See Law 6,404, December 15, 1976. 5 The IGP-DI is a price index calculated by the Fundação Getúlio Vargas using the arithmetic mean of the wholesale price index (IPA), the consumer price index (IPC), and the construction price index (INCC). The "DI" means the index takes into account only internal prices. It does not take into account, for instance, the prices of exports. Our logic to choose this index was that we wanted to use a deflator that would overestimate inflation. Yet, even with this index, our data in the late 1980s, the period of hyperinflation, has jumps that are mostly captured by our year dummies in our regression analysis. military governments, most lasting almost four year. During this period there were no direct elections for governor or president and there were only indirect elections for Congress. There were significant differences in terms of the strategies of the different military governments, some were more nationalistic and some were more repressive.
Yet, the objective of these governments was rapid industrial development with macroeconomic stability (Gaspari, 2002a (Gaspari, , b, 2003a A gradual transition to democracy culminated in 1985 when for the first time in twenty years there was a new civilian president, albeit indirectly elected. After that, Brazil had a succession of democratic presidents. The economic crisis and the level of control over SOEs increased with the transition to democracy, in particular the level of control over salaries, hiring, and expenditures of these firms. Thus, the constraints over managers changed significantly in 1985. We would expect that the more constraints CEOs faced, the less impactful their tenure was and, thus, then the lower importance their background would have to determine firm performance.
DATA

Company Data
In order to examine the role of CEOs in the performance of SOEs in Brazil, we collected a detailed database of around 250 SOEs between 1973 and 1993. This database comes mostly from the reports of SEST, an agency the Brazilian government created in 1979 to regulate federal SOEs (Brazil, 1981 (Brazil, -1985 Brazil, 1986 Brazil, -1993 . We added also data for a series of companies controlled by states in Brazil using the business magazines Exame and Visão, which published financials and the number of employees of a large number of firms annually. This same source was used to compile the database from 1973 to 1976 for federal SOEs.
The main financial indicators used in this paper are the following. To measure size we used the natural logarithm of total assets. To measure capital intensity we use fixed assets to total assets. To proxy for productivity we used either revenues per employee or profits per employee. We also use several performance indicators, including return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), both of which were estimated using net earnings (earnings after depreciation, interests, and taxes) over assets or total shareholder's equity (i.e., net worth), respectively. We also create a measure of leverage that is simply liabilities over assets. Technically this measure should go from 0 to 1, but because SOEs operated with losses frequently, even for a couple of years in a row, it is common to observe companies operating for a couple of years with negative equity, and thus leverage larger than one. We decided to cap leverage at 1 and then study separately when companies went bankrupt (when liabilities were larger than assets). Finally, we also add one specification in which we measure how much either CEOs or their background help us to explain total factor productivity (measured as the residual from a linear estimation using the logarithm of a simple Cobb Douglass function that has capital-using fixed assets as proxy-and labor-using the number of employees as proxy-as inputs and firm-level revenues as output.
Data on CEOs and Their Backgrounds
We were able to obtain the name and tenure information of close to 856 CEOs of state-owned (federal and state) enterprises in Brazil, between 1973 and 1993 . Given the nature of the data our research for biographical information was unconventional and eclectic. We used the collection of biographies of the Center for Research and Documentation of Brazil's Contemporary History, known as CPDOC (CPDOC, 2012), biographical dictionaries, biographies published by the companies, biographies available on the Internet, emails to the CEOs themselves, phone calls, and university records (including records from the Superior School of War and other Army schools).
We searched for biographical information of the 856 CEOs we identified (for close to 250 firms). Yet, out of those, we only have relatively complete biographical information for 467 CEOs. This information includes year of birth, schools attended, the BA major and graduate degree, experience in the armed forces (navy, army, and air force), whether the CEO ever ran for a political post or ran a ministry, and some information of their careers as managers, such as years of experience in the firm, whether they had experience in the private sector, and whether they had experience in the industry before turning CEOs. We also know who in our database attended the Superior School of War, a graduate school of national security and strategic studies for high-ranking (civilian) officials and military officers.
Using the education information we gathered, we coded whether a CEO attended a top university in Brazil. We define top universities as federal universities, the University of Sao Paulo, and the Technological Institute of Aeronautics (known as ITA). 6 We think it is important to separate CEOs using this variable because of the competitive nature of the admissions process. As noted before, the admissions test for these universities was extremely competitive; usually their graduates were the most talented college graduates in Brazil. Even if there was an exam to enter the civil service and join a state-owned enterprise, we think those exams were not as difficult or selective as the admissions exam to top universities. Thus, there is variation in terms of abilities within the CEOs of the firms in our sample.
In any given year we have basic biographical information for between 100 and 250 CEOs of SOEs. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the distribution of CEO backgrounds throughout our period. There are three patterns that should be noted. First, the number of politicians running SOEs increases after the democratic transition in 1985 and the proportion of politicians goes to over 10% of the total sample. This is a logical outcome because we think that with democracy increased the need to give out pork to different constituencies and party members, which included distributing jobs in SOEs. Second, the proportion of Technical CEOs running SOEs remained relatively high (around 60% of the total) throughout our period (or about 60 to 100 technical CEOs per year). Third, the proportion of military CEOs is close to 30% before 1985, but remains at around 20% after that, partly because we include companies that were closely tied to military aims.
This proportion is not that high compared to the number of military CEOs in SOEs in
Chile or Peru during the same period, where over 50% of the company managers had military backgrounds. 7 The market for talent in SOEs differs from the market for talent in publicly traded corporations in developed countries such as the United States in at least two ways. First, since SOEs were part of a state apparatus and politics determined the top jobs in government, all of the CEOs in our database had to be approved by the government. During the military regime, the government appointed military to run firms as well as politicians. According to Schneider (1991, p. 53) , service men who took civilian jobs in SOEs had two years to return to the army (or navy, or air force). Yet many chose to stay as CEOs or top executives in SOEs. These people were mostly military engineers and service men with experience in the management of military enterprises. Furthermore, governments in the military and democratic regime also appointed what we call technical-politicians and technical-military CEOs. As we explain below, these were managers with technical backgrounds, long careers in the industry, and who had a mixed background.
The second difference with the market for talent in private companies is that officials in SOEs tended to have careers mostly in one or two government firms for at least three reasons. First, white-collar workers in Brazilian SOEs started their careers by passing a competitive exam to join the public service. Once they entered an SOE they had employment guaranteed for life (unless they broke the law). Second, it was costly for officers to leave a SOE to join the private sector, because unless it was to serve in the government or in other SOE, a prolonged leave of absence meant losing the career track and the opportunity at permanent employment that the government offered. The exam to join the public service is not easy and is extremely competitive because for every job opening in SOEs there are hundreds to thousands of applicants, depending on the level of qualifications required for the job. Finally, SOE jobs were actually some of the best white collar positions in Brazil (at least until the 1980s) because salaries in SOEs were higher than the equivalent salaries in the private sector. 8 In fact, the military government tried to improve the performance of state-owned enterprises by passing a Decree-Law that allowed these firms to have more autonomy and flexibility to hire officials. 9 For instance, according to Trebat (1983, p. 48) , this measure would improve performance by allowing SOEs to "offer higher salaries and better benefits in order to recruit and maintain qualified staff."
The government usually offered SOE officials who made it to the top executive positions of their firms and who had either a good track record or good political connections an opportunity to run or work in other government enterprises. For instance, the president could nominate individuals for CEO positions as well as other executive positions in SOEs without making them pass the bureaucratic examination that other employees had to pass. That is why we find that 27% of the CEOs of SOEs for which we have biographical information were actually outsiders to the firm they ran.
Still, most of the CEOs who switched from one state-owned company to another did it among companies of the same state-owned business group. 10 Even if most CEOs in our database had careers only in one state-owned company or business group, we found that out of the 856 CEOs we tracked, 114 ran more than one SOE. Out of those 114 CEOs, 96 actually kept both jobs for three years or more. Those CEOs who switched firms were apparently more educated (i.e., 63% of them had graduate degrees, compared to 27% for other managers), and were more commonly educated abroad. Yet, only a small proportion of them attended the elite universities.
This perhaps implies that in some cases the screening of SOE managers was poor, given that many CEOs were managers who did not attend elite universities and were allowed to join the public service without passing the civil service exam. Among the CEOs that jumped from one SOE to another over 70% were from technical backgrounds, 10% were military, and 23% had technical backgrounds and political careers, the rest had mixed backgrounds.
METHODS
The study of CEOs of SOEs and their effects is divided into three parts. The first part looks at CEO effects in general using a simple variance decomposition approach. 10 Since the 1960s the government put some of its SOEs under the umbrella of a business group. That is, the government created or selected one big firm to be the holding company of a business groups that contained a variety of firms. The government created conglomerates or business groups in steel (Siderbras), telecommunications (Telebras), electricity (Eletrobras), nuclear power (Nuclebras), ports (Portobras), mining (Vale do Rio Doce), oil and gas (Petrobras), and railways (RFFSA) (Trebat, 1983) .
The second part looks at CEO effects using only those CEOs that switched companies.
The last part examines if the background and education of CEOs help us explain some of the variation we observe within firms over time.
Variance Decomposition and CEO Effects
In order to decompose the variance of our performance variables we use panel data regressions and, one by one, we see how much of the total variation in performance variables is explained by time (year dummies), fixed industry characteristics (industry dummies), industry characteristics that vary over time, company effects (characteristics of firms that do not change over time), and CEO effects. We run a simple OLS regression using the following specification:
where yit represents firm-level performance: either return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), leverage, or labor productivity (defined as either revenues per worker or net earnings per worker). We then add each of the variables one at a time, beginning with year fixed effects (t ); industry fixed effects (Industryi); industry-year effects (Ind*yearit); followed by adding a set of company characteristics which depending on the specification may include firm age, leverage, labor productivity, and capital intensity (fixed/assets); then company fixed effects (i); and, finally, adding all the CEO dummies, one per CEO (CEO). For each regression we look at the adjusted R 2 to see how much each variable contributes to explain the variation in the dependent variable. We call the contribution of the CEO dummies, the "CEO effect."
We repeat this procedure with a specification that that estimates total factor productivity (TFP), 11 by decomposing the residual of a simple production function according to the contribution of the same dummies described above. The specification is the following:
Ln(revenues)it = 1ln(employees) + 2ln(fixed assets/assets)
because TFP fluctuates with business cycles and fluctuates more in some industries than others, we make sure that this specification controls for year fixed effects (t ), industry fixed effects (Industryi), and industry-year effects (Ind*yearit). We also add company and CEO fixed effects.
Obviously when dealing with SOEs there is always the problem that efficiency or performance is hard to measure because governments charge SOEs with a "double bottom line." SOEs are usually charged with maximizing a social variable (e.g., employment or maximizing the coverage of the power grid, etc.) and at the same time they need to watch the bottom line, i.e., their profitability (Ahroni, 1986) . A moneylosing SOE may serve a social purpose in the short run, but in the longer term it becomes a burden for the government finances and can lead to unsustainable fiscal situations for governments and to dependence on government support on the part of SOEs (Shirley & Nellis, 1991; World Bank, 1996) .
For that reason, we are less convinced about our comparisons of profitability or productivity across SOEs. Different companies may be focused on solving different problems. Instead, we give more weight to our analysis of the performance of companies over time. If a company is always charged with a specific double-bottom line, then changes in performance over time that are not attributable to macroeconomic or industry conditions will more likely be the product of changes in management.
Given that managers of SOEs in Brazil tried to keep their firms autonomous from the government, we expect to find that CEOs matter and explain a sizable portion of the performance of these companies in Brazil
Effects Using CEOs who Ran More Than One Firm
Following the work of Bertrand and Schoar (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003) we measure how much of the variance in performance and other indicators we can explain with CEOs who ran more than one SOE in Brazil between 1973 and 1993. In order to capture the effects of these CEOs, we follow the literature and look only at CEOs that kept their jobs for more than three years. For this purpose we run OLS regressions that look like equations (1) and (2), but that instead of having dummies for all CEOs we run these regressions with a restricted sample of only those companies that had CEOs who switched firms. If these CEOs were selected by the government to run several firms, we expect them to either be excellent CEOs, perhaps to turnaround firms, or, on the other hand, if these CEOs were able to move from firm to firm because of their political connections, we could expect them to perhaps be underperformers.
Do CEO Backgrounds Matter?
The final part of the paper looks at how much the background of CEOs matter to explain company performance. We separate training from abilities by including a variable that separates CEOs according to whether they attended a top university in Brazil. Then, we code training into technical, military, and non-technical, non-military CEOs. Additionally we add a control for politician CEOs, those who had a political career and, thus, may have had ulterior motives to either do well or to pursue social objectives rather than trying to maximize profits.
Following the extant literature we separate the background of CEOs into three variables. First, we coded as technical CEOs all managers that did chose a technical undergraduate major (e.g., engineer, economist, accountant, business major) or if their backgrounds were somewhat technical and relevant for the company. For example, a geologist is not a technical person if he works in a food distribution company, but he is a technical person if he works for a mining company. We code CEOs according to their college degrees because most of the CEOs who chose technical degrees in college and did a masters or Ph. D. usually chose the same major. 12 That is, there are no lawyers who then went on to do a master's degree in engineering. Finally, there are distinctive features of technical CEOs beyond their university degree that makes us expect them to be more autonomous from the wishes and mandates of politicians. According to Schneider (1991) , managers with technical backgrounds, técnicos, were managers "with university-level, non-humanities training in an area such as engineering, economics,
[business] administration, accounting, and law" (p.55).
Second, we coded CEOs as politicians if they held a political post during the period we study. The political positions we took into account to code a CEO as a politician are at the federal level: ministers, senators, and congressmen; at the state level:
governor, secretary, and member of the state assembly; and, at the municipal level: major, secretary, and member of the city council. The objective of separating the politicians is straightforward. Because politicians care about their political careers more than what they care for an organization or the process of socialization in that organization, we would expect them to be less concerned with the profitability or efficiency of the firm than technical CEOs. Politicians also may care about rent-seeking, thus using SOEs for corruption. This is close to what Shleifer and Vishny (1998) call the "grabbing hand" view, in which the "key problem of state firms is government interference in their activities to direct them to pursue political rather than economic goals, such as excess employment" (p. 10).
We separate the technical-politicians because some of these technical CEOs did not follow a traditional career path. Technical-politicians jumped from one company to another, even across business groups, or took a leave of absence from the company to run a ministry or advise a president. These technical-politicians did not have a broad base and did not rely on electoral politics. Their political career depended on their career merits, technical expertise, and connections at the top. Think of the example of Shigeaki Ueki, a technical-politician who started his career in Petrobras, where he ended being Director of Marketing and CEO of some of its subsidiaries. In 1974, he became the Ministry of Mines and Energy (thus the code technical-politician), to then become CEO of Petrobras in 1979. Thus, we would expect that their technical background would attenuate the rent-seeking behavior of these CEOs, also the fact that they had employment security (which may create less temptation to steal than say a CEO who knows is going to be in the company only a couple of years).
Third, we coded as military all of those CEOs who were part of the armed forces at some point, either in the army, navy, or air force. In general, military men had a separate identity and managing style than technical CEOs or politicians. The career track of these service men was quite distinctive. "Officer cadets often come from military families and attend military high schools before entering the officer academy" (Schneider, 1991) . After the officer academy, colonels and junior generals are likely to spend a year at the military think-tank, the Superior War College (Escola Superior de Guerra). Some officers chose to leave the armed forces and pursue careers as managers of SOEs. We think that both the leadership and technical skills acquired during their training as military officers, as well as the socialization process in the armed forces, Finally, we would expect that during the military government , CEOs with military background had more access to resources and information than nonmilitary managers. Especially because the generals in power appointed some of these CEOs either because they knew them, they trusted them, or because they knew they could get the job done.
In sum, we would expect military CEOs to over perform other CEOs, especially nontechnical CEOs. In particular, we expect the effect to be strong during the dictatorship years, because the connections of military CEOs to the government would be stronger and would probably give them easier access to resources, such as subsidized credit. If we were to find positive effects of military CEOs on SOE performance during the democratic period, then that would tell us that military training provides leadership skills and managerial abilities that matter for running this type of companies.
Finally, we also separate the military who had technical backgrounds (e.g., military engineers) from regular military officials because part of the test is focused on 13 Additionally, military academies in Brazil have a long tradition for being progressive institutions teaching officers leadership skills that can be applied both in the battlefield and in politics. The two first presidents of Brazil (in the 1890s) were military officers. Our identification relies on using equations 1 and 2, with fixed effects, and then adding the controls outlined above for the type of CEO. In that way our identification will come from changes in the type of CEO within the same firm. This set up allows us to disentangle the company effect from the CEO background effect (the most common problem in the literature on CEO background in Brazil) and helps us to minimize the endogeneity of CEO background according to the type of firm they work for (e.g. telecommunication companies usually hire engineers). This means that companies that always had a technical as CEO are not helping us to identify the effect of background on performance. For instance, the prototypical case study to analyze CEO backgrounds is the Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, a firm that never had a non-technical as CEO and that, therefore, does not help us to identify the effect of CEO background on performance.
Findings
Do CEOs matter?
In Table 3 we show the estimated effect of CEOs on the performance of SOEs using simple variance decomposition. The estimated CEO effect is 14% of the variation in return on assets, which is in the upper bound of the estimates of the literature (which vary between 8% and 14%). CEO effects also explain 14% of the variation in leverage.
Finally, we find, surprisingly, that CEO effects explain 41% of the variation in labor productivity, while they explain only 1.5% of the variation in total factor productivity.
The former results, is a very strong effect and may reflect the fact that CEOs in SOEs in Brazil did not have many levers to change the ways of firms, but adding more employees was one variable that, at least before 1983, was at their discretion.
Identifying the Effects of CEOs who Switched Companies
We then proceed to examine CEO effects by looking exploiting only the variation that comes from CEOs that switched companies. Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the companies that we include in this study in order to describe the sample of SOEs we use for this part of our study. We can see that the firms that had CEOs who switched companies (firms with CEOs who ran two or more firms in their careers) were larger, with a higher turnover, with higher profitability, higher productivity, and with a higher growth in assets. Thus, our sample is picking up some of the best firms, but not necessarily the most capital-intensive firms.
The CEOs we include in this sample differ only slightly from the other CEOs in our database. Table 5 shows that CEOs who switched firms tended to be more likely to be educated abroad or to have a graduate degree. Yet, only 22% of them attended an elite university (i.e., federal university).
In Table 6 we show the results of our regression analysis of the contribution of these CEOs who switch companies to explain the variation in performance and leverage.
We follow the methodology of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and display only the adjusted R-squared of the regressions with and without dummies for CEOs that switched companies, the F test to see if those CEO dummies are jointly significant, and, finally, the contribution to adjusted R-squared of these CEOs. We conduct three tests, one for the full sample, one for the sample that covers only the period in which Brazil was under a military dictatorship (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) , and the period of our sample in which Brazil had a democratic government (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) .
In the second column we show the results for return on assets. According to our tests, adding controls for the CEOs who switch companies explains an additional 2% of the variation in returns. This is lower than our previous estimate of 14% (considering all CEO) probably because previous estimates are associated with temporal firm-specific shock spuriously correlated with CEO change. The effect of these CEOs on ROA is a bit higher during the democratic period. Our results for return on equity (ROE) are less consistent, but for the full sample CEOs that switch companies explains also close to 2% of the variation.
In the fifth column of Table 6 we show that the CEOs who switched firms explain almost 5% of the variation in leverage. In column 6 and 7 we show the results when our productivity variables are used as dependent variables (either revenue per worker or total factor productivity). In this latter exercise, CEOs explain about 10% of the variation when we use the full sample with labor productivity as dependent variable or using the TFP regressions (equation 2). This is consistent with the finding from our previous section that CEO effects were higher for the labor productivity regressions.
Finally, in the last two columns of Table 6 we use as dependent variables the number of years in which the company suffered losses and the number of years in which the company was bankrupt. The CEOs that switched companies explain between 3.5% and 5% of the variation.
Our results show CEO effects that are a bit lower than those found by Bertrand and Schoar (2003) . For instance, using their proxy for ROA they find that CEOs explain about 5% of the variation in performance, while we find that CEOs explain only 2%.The difference may be related to the fact that even if SOEs in Brazil were relatively autonomous (especially before 1985), they still operated under more constraints than private firms. SOEs had some supervision from government officials and were charged with following the general development plans of the government. Some of the SOEs in our sample had also social objectives that may have diverted attention from profitability.
For instance, some of the switching CEOs in our sample were engineers who worked for a variety of telecommunications companies. These CEOs switched companies because they were sent by the holding company to set up or revamp the operation of telephone companies in the frontier of the country (the Amazon region, in the state of Mato Grosso, or in the small states in the northeast of the country), places where profitability was perhaps a lower priority for the government. Still, our results should be surprising because we find consistently stronger CEO effects during the democratic period in Brazil (1985 Brazil ( -1993 , when controls over the budgets, salaries, and hiring policies of SOEs were tighter. How can that be the case?
We think the story that comes out of those results is related to how the constraints over SOEs are not equally binding for all companies, CEOs either with connections or those who are part of the clientelistic network of the ruling coalition may have more leeway to run companies, say to get additional inputs at privileged prices, to get loans from the development banks at subsidized rates, etc. In fact, the companies who had CEOs who switched companies outperform the average performance of companies in the full sample.
Does CEO background Matter?
Beyond the analysis of the CEOs who switched firms, our data allow us to see if CEO background is correlated with performance, productivity, and leverage. We first test the claims of the literature on CEOs with technical and military backgrounds. First, we examine if companies ran by technical and military CEOs seem to have significant differences with other firms. In Table 7 , we show the mean and standard deviation of the SOEs in our database by manager type. In Panel B of Table 7 , we show the simple difference of means test, which indicates that technical CEOs ran companies with less assets and lower turnover, leverage, return on assets, return on equity, and productivity per worker, on average. Military CEOs in this simple exercise do not seem to have any advantage either.
We then proceed, in Table 9 , to run random effects regressions using our CEO backgrounds both for the full sample and for the sample of companies that has CEOs that switch companies. The results again do not provide consistent evidence to support the hypothesis that technical CEOs ran companies that performed better than other companies. In contrast, there is more consistent evidence showing that military CEOs ran companies that outperformed the average SOE in Brazil. The evidence for other types of CEOs is inconclusive, even if both technical-politician and technical-military CEOs seem to run companies with higher return on equity.
Our final step then is to look at the association between CEO backgrounds and SOE performance using fixed effects. Arguably, the above correlations may be driven by unobservable factors causing an spurious association between CEO type and performance. In the first five columns of Table 10 we examine the effect of each manager type on performance, one by one. Surprisingly, the coefficient for technical CEO is negative (e.g., switching from the other types of CEOs to a technical CEO leads to lower return on assets of almost 2%). Technical-military CEOs seem to drive returns up. We find consistent results in Panel B, where we use return on equity as dependent variable.
From columns 6 to 9 we include all the manager types simultaneously and we experiment with leaving the non-technical civilian CEOs and the technical as excluding categories. The results show that switching from a civilian to a military CEO had a strong positive effect on performance during the dictatorship (e.g., an increase in average ROA of almost 18%). Technical-military CEOs had the most consistent, positive coefficient. That means that switching either from a civilian or technical to a technicalmilitary CEO led to an increase in return on assets of over 4%. In sum, other than the military background, we do not find strong results for either politician CEOs or CEOs with technical backgrounds.
In all of the regressions in Table 10 we include the control for whether the CEOs attended a top university. This variable measures the effect of a change from a CEO who did not attend one of these universities to having a CEO that did go to the top schools in Brazil. The results are significant, large, and consistent across specifications and work for both ROA and ROE. The effect of getting a CEO who attended a top university in Brazil could range from having an increase in return on assets between 1.5% and 2.3% (the mean for return on assets is 2.8%), or an increase in return on equity between 4% and 7.6% (the mean for ROE is 6.8%). Because the coefficient for attending an elite university was not significant in the random effects regression, these results suggest that these top-notch CEOs had an effect on performance, but were not running the most profitable firms overall. This strong effect of the top university variable suggests that the most important aspect for SOE performance is not necessarily if the CEO is a politician or technical specialist, but rather if the CEO has superior ability. Thus, our findings confirm previous claims that public sector management is improved with the screening of top talent (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1995) .
Conclusion
We showed that following the traditional literature of CEO effects we find relatively large effects for the managers of SOEs in Brazil. Yet, the identification of CEO effects using dummies for tenure suffers of a series of problems, such as endogeneity and the fact that tenures may be correlated with other factors. Thus, we use the CEOs who switched firms to identify the contribution of managers to SOE performance.
Compared to the extent literature on CEO effects for private companies, we find relatively smaller effects using that methodology (e.g., having CEOs explain 2% of total variation). Our findings are consistent with the fact that CEOs of state-owned companies have more constraints on managerial discretion than their counterparts in the private sector.
Our results are surprising because we find stronger CEO effects during the democracy years in Brazil (1985 Brazil ( -1993 , when controls over the budgets, salaries, and hiring policies of SOEs were tighter. We believe this may suggest that in settings in which companies overall face more constraints, CEOs with connections that gave them more access to resources (e.g., those who could get concessions from the government and loans from development banks at subsidized rates), seem to improve the performance of their firms more than other CEOs. For instance, military CEOs during the military government have strong and large effects on performance.
Finally, we find that backgrounds explain some of the variation in performance of state-owned firms (we double our adjusted R-squared when we include controls for CEO backgrounds). Technical background or being a politician were not important to explain performance, yet we find strong and significant results suggesting that military CEOs are different and usually led firms to be more profitable, especially when those military CEOs also had a technical background relevant to the objective of the firm (i.e., if they were technical-military CEOs). Because we do not have precise data on particular features of military training that might explain this result, we leave a more detailed analysis of military CEOs for future research.
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